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ABSTRACT
As cyberspace matures, the international system faces a new
challenge in confronting the use of force. Non-State actors continue
to grow in importance, gaining the skill and the expertise necessary
to wage asymmetric warfare using non-traditional weaponry that
can create devastating real-world consequences. The international
legal system must adapt to this battleground and provide workable
mechanisms to hold aggressive actors accountable for their
actions. The International Criminal Court—the only criminal
tribunal in the world with global reach—holds significant promise
in addressing this threat. The Assembly of State Parties should
construct the definition of aggression to include these emerging
challenges. By structuring the definition to confront the challenges
of cyberspace—specifically non-State actors, the disaggregation of
warfare, and new conceptions of territoriality—the International
Criminal Court can become a viable framework of accountability
for the wars of the twenty-first century.

INTRODUCTION
Cyber warfare, a subset of a larger field known as information
operations, 2 until recently appeared to belong to the realm of science
fiction. Although cyber attacks have occurred throughout most of the
Internet’s history, 3 States have just begun to include them in their doctrine
¶1
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and tactics. 4 Cyber attacks do not fit neatly into the traditional international
framework governing the use of force. Cyber attacks represent a new form
of disaggregated warfare, substantially conducted by non-State collectives,
that displays new conceptions of territoriality. These challenges require
substantial adjustments of the international system. The Assembly of State
Parties’ (ASP) on-going effort to define aggression presents a powerful
opportunity to confront both of these issues simultaneously. The ASP
should adapt its definition to better account for this emerging threat by
including the aggressive acts of non-State collectives. That definition should
be broadly interpreted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to include
these new conceptions of territoriality and, most importantly, the new
weapons of cyberspace.

I. NOTABLE INSTANCES OF CYBER ATTACK – THE NEW
BATTLEFIELD OF CYBERSPACE
Just before midnight on August 8, 2008, Georgian military
personnel moved into the semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia. 5
Georgia maintains its military action was purely responsive to Russian
conduct. 6 Georgia cites both steadily increasing attacks from separatist
groups and alleged incursions by Russian troops into South Ossetian
territory as justification for their subsequent armed response. 7 Russia
continues to claim that it acted only after Georgia made a brash attempt to
reclaim its break-away providence. 8
¶2

¶3
The bombs and bullets flew simultaneously with packets and
botnets. For the first time, a ground attack coincided with a cyber attack. 9
Georgian websites were bombarded by thousands of computers in what
technology experts call a Distributed Denial of Service attack, or DDoS. 10

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can be accomplished with only one
computer, and in a multitude of ways. The goal of a DoS attack is to prevent

¶4
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the intended individual users from utilizing a certain networked resource. A
variety of techniques are available to exploit the underlying Internet
communication architecture and prevent legitimate use of networks. Most
DoS attacks flood the target network with bogus traffic or overwhelm a
target computer with bogus requests preventing the legitimate use of either
resource.
¶5
DoS attacks evolved to DDoS attacks, which are much more
debilitating and considerably more difficult to defend against. DDoS attacks
use primarily the same tactics as a DoS attack but from multiple source
computers. These computers are usually controlled remotely through
vulnerabilities or previous malware infections. Vulnerability attacks exploit
existing deficiencies in the operating software of a computer. These ‘bugs’
can be used to either disable the targeted computer, or in some instances can
be used to cause the targeted computer to attack a second computer, without
the knowledge of the targeted computer's owner. 11 More commonly, DDoS
attacks utilize malicious software (or malware). Malware refers to computer
code specifically written with harmful intent.
¶6
The false requests from a DDoS attack caused Georgian
government websites to go offline. 12 Internet service in Georgia slowed to a
crawl as bogus requests clogged the limited data routes in and out of the
country. 13 Georgian government officials experienced extreme difficulty
communicating with their citizens and the outside world. 14 Hackers defaced
Georgian websites with Russian nationalistic propaganda.15 Georgia blamed
the Russian government, claiming it was the victims of State cyber
warfare. 16 Russia denied sponsoring or supporting any cyber attack on
Georgia. 17 Russian officials claimed the attacks were likely the result of
overzealous individuals acting on nationalistic sentiment. 18

A new form of warfare
¶7
When considering the impact of cyberspace on international law, it
is important to note the differences between the variable levels of malicious
cyber activity, which include cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism,
11
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cyber attacks, and cyber warfare. 19 The intentions of the perpetrator and the
effects of the act are one useful way to classify the malicious activity. 20
Cyber crime is activity conducted for profit, primarily motivated by
financial gain or notoriety. 21 Cyber crime typically involves the production
of malware, the distribution of child pornography, hijacking for ransom, the
sale of mercenary services, and the like. 22 Cyber espionage is characterized
by a motivation to discover sensitive information rather than that of causing
harm. 23 Cyber espionage can be conducted by an individual or a collective
with the goal of pecuniary gain or strategic military advantage. 24 Cyber
terrorism, like all terrorism, is intended to influence an audience or motivate
a government through threats and violence. 25 Cyber terrorists use the
malicious tools available in cyberspace as weapons against cyber and real
world targets. 26
¶8
The definition of cyber attack remains inconsistent. Some
commentators use the term to encompass a wide variety of acts of cyber
terrorism and cyber warfare. 27 Other commentators use cyber attacks as a
separate category. 28 Even among these experts, usage varies. Some argue
that cyber warfare requires the simultaneous use of conventional
weaponry. 29 Others categorize cyber attacks by the identity and motivations
of the attackers. 30 Still others look to the type of targets and degree of harm
caused by the attacks. 31 No expert questions that Georgia was the victim of
organized cyber attacks, but many experts scoff at the notion that the attacks
amounted to cyber warfare. 32
¶9
One difficulty in the treatment of cyber attack in international law
stems from the ease with which an attack can morph between levels, and the

19

Technology Quarterly-Cyber Warfare: Marching Off to Cyberwar, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 71, available at 2008 WLNR 23421990
[hereinafter ECONOMIST].
20
Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 301 (2008).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Solce, supra note 20.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
ECONOMIST, supra note 19.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Ethan Zuckerman, Misunderstanding Cyberwar in Georgia, REUTERS, Aug.
16, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSGOR66065320080816.

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

difficulty in determining the level at the time of the attack. The steps used to
gain access to a network for the purposes of espionage will be nearly
identical to those used for access in wartime. While disguise and deception
have been a part of warfare since ancient times, the ease and speed with
which a cyber infiltrator can change roles coupled with the potential
devastation from an attack on certain networks create a need for swift
defensive actions. Due to these difficulties, a cautious network defense may
treat lower level attacks and more serious attacks similarly. These
challenges create a significant proportionality issue in self-defense
decisions.
While the cyber attacks launched to date may seem relatively tame
when compared to the destruction capable of traditional instrumentalities of
war, experts generally agree that potential cyber attacks of the very near
future are likely to carry significantly greater consequences. 33 The greater
the network integration of a target country’s infrastructure, the greater its
potential vulnerability. 34 Georgia and Estonia suffered limited real world
consequences from their attacks largely due to their limited reliance on
cybernetic networks. 35 In a country as reliant as the United States,
hypothetical targets include the disabling of water purification systems, 36
the intentional misrouting of trains causing massive collisions, 37 the
disruption of air-traffic control, 38 the intentional opening of dams, 39 and
¶10
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potentially the meltdown of nuclear reactors, 40 all resulting in significant
loss of life and property very much on par with damage caused by
traditional weaponry. 41
Actual loss of life and destruction of property are possibilities of
cyber attack, but the more likely and prevalent threat stems from malicious
interference with communication networks and economic markets. A cyber
attacker could manipulate the stock market or cause massive and sustained
outages of wireless networks. 42 While these acts lack the physical
destruction of other attacks, the potential economic consequences and
breadth of their impact make them a serious threat to the security of a State.
When the greater likelihood of these attacks is combined with the
possibility of sustained or repeated interference with these increasingly
important aspects of our infrastructure, the threat seems quite ominous.
However, even a State-sponsored manipulation of economic markets would
fail to meet the traditional definition of international aggression. 43
¶11

Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors
¶12
The current State actor requirement in international law greatly
limits its applicability to cyber attacks. Evidence certainly shows that a
portion of the attacks on Georgia were carried out by individuals without
direct affiliation to any group or State. 44 Websites displayed how-to guides
providing eager individuals step-by-step instructions on how to configure
their computers to attack Georgian websites. 45 Other websites coordinated
the volunteers by posting the statuses of target sites. 46 This information
allowed individuals to redirect their computers from disabled targets to new
targets. 47 Yet these voluntary attacks gained momentum only after the initial

40

John F. Murphy, Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 33, at 323, 326.
41
It should be noted these attacks would generally require significantly greater
sophistication than that shown in the Russian-Georgian conflict. While the tools
are certainly available and the defenses frequently porous enough, how
widespread and how porous are issues of strenuous debate.
42
Solce, supra note 20, at 310.
43
See Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 1, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression], available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?20+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int%27l+L.+1+p
df.
44
ECONOMIST, supra note 19.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

wave of cyber attacks. 48 Most importantly, they fail to explain the ‘staging
attacks’, or trial runs, that occurred weeks prior to the ground war. 49
¶13
In July, independent non-profit monitoring groups noticed a
significant number of malicious attacks on Georgian websites. 50 These
attacks were debilitating but brief, likely a dress rehearsal for the August
attacks. 51 Some of the very same websites attacked in July were attacked
again in August after the conventional war began. 52 The immediate
coordination and the sophistication of the August attacks suggests strong
organizational influence. 53 Many have suggested responsibility for the
attacks rests with a nefarious organization, the Russian Business Network
(RBN). 54
¶14
The RBN thrives in the largely unregulated and wild-west
atmosphere of Russian cyberspace. 55 The RBN has a hand in some of the
worst aspects of the Internet. 56 Child pornography, malware, spam, identity
theft, and offensive cyber attack capabilities are sold for profit by the
RBN. 57 Although the RBN has no headquarters, website, or legal status,
their name appears on the registration of thousands of websites. 58
¶15
Independent companies are also available for hire to direct cyber
attacks at ‘legitimate’ targets. 59 Sony, Universal and other large copyright
holders have hired such independent companies to initiate DDoS attacks
against users of file sharing software suspected of sharing their copyrighted
materials. 60 However, these cyber-mercenaries are not overly discriminating
in their target selection. 61 One reason file sharing software remains legal is
its ability to allow lower budget producers to share their work. 62 In the past,
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mercenaries have mistakenly targeted these legitimate users. 63 While their
inadvertent attacks cause no tangible damage, the economic consequences
can be dire. 64
Other independent companies have even engaged in repeated cyber
attacks against each other. Competition between Internet service providers
(ISPs) has led companies to orchestrate DDoS attacks on each others’
networks in an attempt to hurt their competitor’s quality of service. 65 These
non-State ‘legitimate’ international actors highlight the necessity of
transnational cyber attack regulation. They also illustrate the substantial
likelihood of actual cyber mercenaries who conduct cyber attacks on behalf
of aggressive States. The international legal regime must consider these
groups when drafting tools to punish aggressive acts.
¶16

Other individuals face interesting dilemmas in the cyber frontier. 66
“Bug hunters” are private individuals who can make significant incomes
discovering the flaws in commercially available programming. 67 They then
sell their discoveries to other interested parties. 68 Some of the purchasers
are the software writers themselves, others are security firms, and still
others are motivated by the pure profit afforded by the secondary black
market, or worse their own hacking and malware projects. 69
¶17

This market for vulnerabilities remains completely unregulated. 70
Some individual bug hunters practice self-regulation by refusing to sell their
discoveries to foreign interests. 71 However, the bugs they sell provide keys
to the doors through which cyber warfare can be waged. 72 States are known
purchasers of bug information, and their interest is likely to grow. 73 As the
cyber age expands into the area of warfare, international law must be
equipped to regulate the broad diversity of actors who will play important
roles in tomorrow’s aggressive wars.
¶18
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The Disaggregation of Warfare
International law is ill-equipped to adjust to the disaggregation of
warfare made possible by the cyber age. Combatants and assets need not
physically gather together to conduct their attack. Each asset is capable of
contributing to the collective effort despite physical distance. This is
achieved through the global reach of the Internet, and the homogeneity of
the software running on the computers that it connects. A bug hunter only
gains importance though the remarkable similarities in software design and
use around the globe. These similarities create the global market for
discovered security flaws, and those flaws are fundamental tools in the
writing of malware.

¶19

Some malware allows targeted computers to be ‘slaved’ to the
commands of a single operator who can remotely control aspects of their
behavior. These ‘slave’ computers are commonly known as ‘botnets.’
Botnets can be instructed to carry out activities of the same character as a
DoS attack. However, by their coordinated efforts, these botnets are able to
achieve greater devastation than possible from a single machine. 74 DDoS
attacks are capable of creating significant effects on entire networks without
specifically targeting every computer on the target network.
¶20

The Internet's architecture and homogeneity permits remote, largely
anonymous world-wide access, thereby allowing the triggering of botnet
attacks from any computer with internet connectivity. These same
characteristics also allow the assembly and use of cyber weaponry on a
global scale. For example, the RBN controls multiple world-wide botnets,
capable of being used for DDoS attacks similar to those used against
Georgia. 75 Infected computers scattered across the globe reportedly can be
rented for four cents a machine, providing the equipment needed for a
¶21
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It is important to note that botnets are useful in activities other than DDoS
attacks. Botnets can be used for other malicious purposes, including spam. For
those fortunate enough to not know, spam is the electronic equivalent of junk
mail. Spam messages are unsolicited e-mail, generally advertising products or
websites. Botnets are used to hide the source of spam so as to avoid the rather
extensive filters in use by most e-mail providers, and can be used to execute email floods or bombs.
A form of volunteer botnet has become greatly popular to assist in the
examination of scientific data. Called distributive computing, users install
software on their computer that allows its hardware to be used to examine data
from various scientific experiments. This distributive computing provides a
source of free computing power normally requiring extremely expensive
supercomputers. For an example, see Gewirtz, supra note 59 (discussing
Folding@home, which uses distributive computing to conduct studies of protein
folding and molecular dynamics).
75
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DDoS attack to any paying party for use against any desired target. 76
Alternatively, the RBN could have donated its services in the spirit of
nationalistic motivations. Such an unsolicited donation may explain the
cyber attacks suffered by Georgia. Botnets allow a cyber attacker to
implement a coordinated attack from numerous locations, including within
the target network, with very limited warning for a nominal cost. These
types of cyber attacks defy the simple categorization of traditional
weaponry currently used in international law.
¶22
The cyber attacks on Georgia were not the first instance of
coordinated attacks directed at a former Soviet State. 77 Estonia suffered
similar DDoS attacks in 2007.78 Those attacks began following the Estonian
government’s decision to relocate Soviet era monuments. 79 The attacks
targeted government websites and several Estonian banks. 80
Communication with Estonian emergency services was briefly
interrupted. 81 The Estonian government blamed the Russian government.82
The Russian government denied any involvement. 83 An investigation by
Estonian authorities resulted in charges against an ethnic Russian living in
Estonia for his limited role in the cyber attacks. 84 However, the
investigation still continues, and many observers suspect RBN—if not
Russian intelligence agency—involvement. 85
¶23
In general, while tracing an attack is possible, most traces terminate
at the ISP. An ISP subscriber may be the responsible party, or the ISP may
be yet another conduit through which the attack has been routed.
Regardless, further tracing will require ISP cooperation. 86 Estonia’s

76

Id.
Mark Lander & John Markoff, First war in cyberspace: The lessons of
Estonia, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 29, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR
10334241.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
ECONOMIST, supra note 19.
82
RUSSIAN LIFE, supra note 77.
83
Id.
84
Thomas Claburn, Estonian Hacker Fined for Cyberattack,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=20
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difficulties in tracing and prosecution are emblematic of the inherent
investigative difficulties caused by the disaggregation of cyber warfare. The
number and diversity of culpable individuals involved in international cyber
aggression requires an appropriately tailored and flexible definition of
aggression.

New Conceptions of Territoriality
¶24
Cyberspace challenges a fundamental aspect of international law—
territory. This is best exemplified by the inherent structure of the Internet
when applied to a DDoS attack utilizing a botnet. Botnets are not limited
geographically; the malware that creates them moves freely across national
borders. A DDoS attack using a botnet will cause assets scattered across the
globe to attack a target through the Internet. Internet traffic was specifically
designed to travel over the fastest route possible. 87 This route is not
necessarily the same as the most geographically direct route.
¶25
Information sent over the Internet is divided into packets. These
packets adapt their routes to network congestion, moving through nodes that
result in the fastest communication. Not every packet in a message will take
the same route, as system dynamics change during transmission. After the
packets arrive, often at different times, the target computer reassembles
them to recreate the message. The result of such a system creates complex,
often circuitous routing across substantially more international borders than
traditional instrumentalities of warfare. 88 The routing and tracing difficulties
create significant challenges for the active defense against attacks and also
the law regulating the use of force. 89
¶26
Cyber attacks are not limited to Russia and its former satellite
States. 90 The United States has suffered multiple attacks, allegedly of
Chinese origin. 91 These attacks, code named ‘Titan Rain,’ nearly disrupted
power on the West Coast and resulted in multiple security breaches at
defense contracting companies. 92 Another suspected Chinese attack

ccolo.html (discussing the termination of McColo, a suspected ISP for the RBN
which, when disabled, resulted in the significant reduction of worldwide spam).
87
Tubbs, et al, supra note 36, at 10.
88
Id.
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2(4), in INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 73, 79.
90
Carolyn Duffy Marsan, How close is World War 3.0?, NETWORK WORLD,
Aug. 22, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/082207-cyberwar.html.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 2.
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purportedly disrupted power to fifty million people in North America. 93
These attacks are generally considered probing attacks, designed to test
American countermeasures. 94 Britain also has reported cyber attacks from
both State-sponsored and terrorist sources, referring to them as
“remarkable” in number. 95
¶27
Not all attacks fit neatly into this traditional attacker/attacked State
framework. At the height of the cyber attacks against Georgian websites
during the Russia-Georgia conflict, many besieged websites were
temporarily moved to servers located in the United States. 96 The attacks
continued but the new hosts were better able to defend against them. 97
While the attacked server was located in the United States, the ‘territory’ in
cyberspace being interfered with was that of Georgia.
¶28
Smaller groups and individuals are increasingly capable of cheaply
and efficiently creating significant damage in cyberspace that results in real
world consequences. 98 Attacks are difficult to trace and current legal
structures make prosecution extremely unlikely. 99 As greater reliance on
computer networks expands throughout the globe, the potential destruction
resulting from these attacks will increase. 100 So, too, will the number of
attacks, unless this increase in potential impact is not counterbalanced with
an increase in risk to the future perpetrators. 101
¶29
The international community must recognize this emerging
challenge and structure an international response accordingly. Aggression in
cyberspace requires an international solution. Cyber attacks lack the
traditional geospatial limitations of traditional aggression. The Internet’s
structure permits attacks to occur from any part of the globe against any
target with no early warning or indication. International attempts to regulate
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TIMES (U.K.), August 23, 2008, at 9, available at
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96
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101
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cyber attacks must create individual accountability for the malfeasance of
State and non-State actors. The crime of aggression and the ICC provide a
unique opportunity and appropriate method for tackling this important
issue.

II. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER ATTACKS:
THE EMERGING DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Contemporary international law prohibits the use of force between
States except with UN Security Council authorization or in self-defense. 102
A 1974 General Assembly (GA) Resolution interprets these restrictions
with more specificity. 103 The Resolution (1) limits aggression to the use of
traditional armed force, (2) is highly State centric, (3) uses examples of
traditional aggregated warfare, and (4) relies on traditional concepts of
territorial integrity. 104
¶30

¶31
The 1974 GA Resolution is the basis for the emerging definition of
the crime of aggression in international criminal law, the front in the larger
international law debate over the difference between legal and illegal uses
of force. 105 The 1974 GA Resolution served as the foundation in the
negotiations to determine which acts of political and military leaders qualify
as aggression. 106 As the definition of the international crime of aggression
borrows heavily from the 1974 GA Resolution defining an act of
aggression, the proposed language has many of the same characteristics. 107
¶32
The latest SWGCA definition is made up of two core concepts: the
State act of aggression and the link between the individual and the State
act. 108 The definition of the act of aggression, like the 1974 GA Resolution,
limits its applicability to traditional weaponry of warfare, focuses on acts
committed by and against States, uses aggregated examples of aggression,
and embodies traditional conceptions of territoriality. The link between the
individual and the State act is achieved through four components: the
leadership clause, conduct verbs, a liability doctrine, and modes of
102

U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4, arts. 39 & 51.
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104
Id.
105
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106
Id.
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108
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perpetration/participation. 109 Each choice made by the SWGCA has
significant implications for the definition of the crime of aggression when
applied to cyber warfare. The 1974 GA Resolution and the SWGCA
definition will be examined in relation to the challenges raised by cyber
warfare.

A new form of warfare
¶33
The GA Resolution explicitly applies to the traditional instrument
of armed force and the traditional weaponry used in armed attacks. 110
Article 3 of the Resolution provides examples of aggression, referring to the
attack, invasion, bombardment and blockade of a State by the traditional
armed forces—land, air, sea, or marine—of another State. 111 While the
Resolution carefully emphasizes that the examples are not exhaustive,
power for constituting other acts as aggressive lies solely with the Security
Counsel. 112 Indirect force is limited to acts which are sufficiently similar in
severity and tactics to be analogous to those of conventional armed
forces. 113 Even blockades are only considered aggressive when instituted by
the armed forces of another State. 114

Armed force was not the only form of force considered by the
negotiating States. The 1967 and 1973 Oil Embargoes created significant
support for the inclusion of economic aggression in the GA Resolution. 115
The Resolution was purposefully drafted to appease these interests through
the inclusion of Article 4, which underscored the exemplary nature of the
list. 116 In doing so, the Resolution neither endorsed nor precluded the
finding that aggression could take the form of an unarmed act. 117
¶34

¶35
While making a reference to the GA Resolution, the SWGCA
included in their proposed definition the Resolution’s list of acts from
Article 3 that would qualify as aggression. 118 However, they eliminated
Article 4, instead agreeing on language that allows for interpretation of the
list as either open or closed. 119 By adopting the explicit reliance on
traditional instrumentalities and weaponry of Article 3 and eliminating the
caveat of Article 4, the SWGCA has severely restricted the application of
109
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their definition to cyber warfare. Yet cyber warfare certainly has the
potential to create catastrophic damage well beyond that resulting from a
threshold traditional weapons attack. The interpretation of the list as open
could conceivably include cyber attacks resulting in physical damages, but
may not include the significant threat of non-lethal communication and
economic disruption through cyber tactics.
¶36
The SWGCA definition also includes a de minimus clause, by
limiting the definition to acts which, “by [their] character, gravity and scale,
constitute[] manifest violation[s] of the Charter of the United Nations.” 120
The de minimus clause provides an important qualifier for the regulation of
cyber attacks under the definition. Many cyber attacks do not rise to the
level of activity to warrant involvement by the ICC. 121 The de minimus
clause makes clear only manifest violations of the UN Charter would trigger
culpability under the statute.
¶37
As discussed below, the leadership clause of the SWGCA definition
contains language that could be strictly interpreted to limit its applicability
to cyber warfare. The conduct verbs provide for a broad level of culpable
activity including planning, preparation, initiation and execution, all of
which are broad enough to include cyber attacks. However, these conduct
verbs have unique implications in the cyber context. The cyber tactic of
creating a ‘trapdoor’ in a networked system for easy future access may be a
preparatory step for aggression. Yet that very same trapdoor may only be
used for cyber-espionage, a legal activity. 122 This duplicitous use creates
difficulty in attributing culpability through the use of the conduct verbs
alone, and creates the necessity for a liability doctrine in the crime of
aggression.
¶38
The SWGCA has multiple liability doctrines to choose from,
including the common law tradition of conspiracy, the doctrines of superior
responsibility, organizational guilt, or joint criminal enterprise (JCE).123 The
likely doctrine of choice appears to be JCE. 124 JCE has gained significantly
in importance since its adoption by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, and was recently incorporated into the Rome
Statute. 125
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JCE eliminates the reliance on a formal chain of command found in
the doctrine of superior responsibility, instead requiring participation in the
criminal enterprise. 126 This aspect of JCE creates significant benefits in the
cyber context. Few, if any, cyber attacks occur in organizations with a
formalized chain of command. Instead, multiple members of an
organization like the RBN create a cyber attack capability which is
implemented on the decision of potentially different members. The system
lacks a true hierarchy of decision making. JCE allows broad connections of
culpability in these fluid organizations.
¶39

¶40
However, this breadth also creates significant problems. Unlike the
concept of conspiracy, JCE does not require explicit agreement on a
common plan. 127 Instead, the Court relies on the participants’ “common
purpose” to connect them to the Collective/State act. 128 This common
purpose test creates difficulty in application to certain cyber tactics, as the
breadth of the common purpose is determined in hindsight by the Court.
The ease with which a cyber attacker can morph between various levels and
forms of attack will undoubtedly create issues related to intent when
determining the breadth of a JCE.

Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors
¶41
The 1974 GA Resolution is limited in scope to acts committed by
State actors. 129 Subsequent articles repeatedly include the limiting phrases
“by a State” and “of a State.” 130 While the definition includes indirect uses
of force, asymmetric conflict 131 is only included if conducted by or on
behalf of a State. 132 Article 7 makes clear the Resolutions’ inapplicability to
certain independence movements without recognized Statehood. 133
¶42
The SWGCA drafters included Article 1 of the Resolution nearly
verbatim in their definition of the specific act of aggression. 134 As discussed
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above, the SWGCA included all Article 3 examples in the proposed
definition. Although the drafters retained the language from Article 1 of the
GA Resolution that refers to ‘manifest violations’ of the UN Charter, the
SWGCA proposed definition replaces the GA Resolution’s clear qualifier
that the list is not exhaustive with the ambiguous phrase “any of the
following acts.” 135
¶43
This change emerged as a balance between competing negotiating
positions in the SWGCA over the issue of whether the list should be open
or closed. 136 The language was chosen to establish the necessary principle
of legality, while not precluding a reading of the list as open. 137 The final
phrasing was the result of political negotiations, with the final interpretation
to be left to the judges. The definition can and should be read as indicating
the list is merely illustrative of actions currently accepted as aggression
under customary international law. 138
¶44
The links between the State/Collective act and the individual
contain similar limitations as the definition of the State act. While the
conduct verbs provide for a rather broad level of culpable activity including
planning, preparation, initiation and execution, 139 its applicability is
severely limited by the leadership clause.
¶45
The leadership clause is intended by the SWGCA to limit the
applicability of the international crime of aggression to leaders and to
exclude followers. 140 The definition specifically limits its application to
“persons in a position effectively to exercise control or to direct the political
or military action of a State.” 141 The leadership clause also limits culpable
conduct to those with direct control over political or military action of the
State. 142
¶46
The leadership clause provides significant limitations on the
regulation of cyber attacks. The vast majority of cyber attacks are conducted
by individuals with only tenuous affiliations to a collective. 143 Most of these
attacks are conducted by individuals for either pecuniary gain or
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notoriety. 144 The remaining attacks are conducted by loosely affiliated
groups of people who lack any meaningful association. 145 Only the
occasional attack is even suspected to be sponsored by or conducted by a
State. 146 However, the number of suspected State sponsored cyber attacks
continue to grow. 147 As States begin to weaponize cyberspace while
independent entities continue to offer cyber attack services to the highest
bidder, serious international aggression will occur in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, significant cyber attacks are more likely to be carried out by
groups unaffiliated with particular States. 148
¶47
Most hackers lack any ability to exercise direct control over another
individual, and certainly not a collective entity. No hacker is the leader of a
State. However, a hacker may be able to gain “effective control” of
significant State assets. If the word “position” in the leadership clause is
interpreted broadly, an individual hacker who launched a barrage of
missiles or issued bogus orders for an invasion could fit within the
leadership clause. The clause becomes more cumbersome when applied to
more plausible scenarios. The opening of dams and rerouting of trains by a
hacker would meet the “effective control” standard, but could easily be
construed as outside the “political or military action” constraint. DDoS
attacks, conducted by either individuals or collective actors, are also
difficult to fit into the leadership clause.
¶48
However, some DDoS attacks may be viewed as meeting the
restrictions of the leadership clause. A DDoS attack can control the military
or political actions of a victim State by preventing the legitimate military
and political leaders from exercising their control. The act of disrupting
control itself is a form of control, through the maintenance of a status quo
and the inability of the target State to react. Such a situation occurred in the
Russia-Georgia conflict: the DDoS attacks prevented the Georgian
government from effectively communicating with their own people and the
outside world. 149 The party or parties responsible for the DDoS attacks
“effectively control[led]” significant political actions of the State by
crippling the State’s ability to act. Had the DDoS attack also prevented the
Georgian armed forces from coordinating an armed response, the State
would have effectively lost control of its own military.

While some cyber attacks could be viewed as meeting the
leadership clause, most are hampered by the requirement of State action.
¶49
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Elimination of ICC jurisdiction over individuals and non-State actors for the
crime of aggression leaves significant and more likely cyber attacks outside
the scope of international regulation. At a minimum, State leaders
authorizing cyber attacks should be held accountable when their actions
create significant international repercussions.

The Disaggregation of Warfare
¶50
The SWGCA definition of the act of aggression, through borrowing
heavily from the 1974 GA Resolution, continues the traditional emphasis on
classic, aggregated warfare. The definition uses the movement of armies,
the blockade by navies, and the sending of armed groups as examples of
aggressive acts. 150 Allowing an attack by a State to originate from its
sovereign territory is also considered an act of aggression. 151
¶51
Cyber warfare, on the other hand, represents a disaggregation of
combatants. The inherent nature of many cyber tactics requires significant
geographic dispersal of assets. The identity and location of attackers are
masked, creating substantial difficulty in determining the identity or
location of the attackers. The potential liability by a State for allowing its
territory to be used for the origination of an aggressive act creates
interesting questions in the context of cyber warfare. Botnets are created
and used across geographic borders, resulting in multiple States hosting the
aggressive forces. Inadvertent hosting of assets used in cyber aggression
would certainly not lead to liability. However, a duty might be construed
against a State to assist in ending the aggression. Because Paragraph 2 (f)
specifically includes allowing territory to be used in an aggressive attack,
States who knowingly allow aggressive action to originate within their
jurisdiction could be considered aggressors under the SWGCA proposed
definition. 152 Paragraph 2(g) expands this to include allowing territory to be
used by armed bands that launch attacks on another country. 153 Without
significant interpretative expansion, the definition can be read to include a
State who knowingly allows aggressive attacks to continually originate
from botnets within its territory.
¶52
The international community must also determine the appropriate
method for dealing with the modern weapons suppliers and mercenaries of
the Internet. The development of malicious software and the sale of
vulnerability information has become a global enterprise. Individuals who
develop malicious software or sell software bugs to the highest bidder must
also be held accountable. Without their assistance, large scale aggressive
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cyber attacks would be impossible. The SWGCA definition would treat
these industrialists of the cyber age similarly to how prosecutors at
Nuremburg treated the leaders of German industry.
The prosecutors at Nuremburg pursued charges against the financial
and industrial leaders in Nazi Germany. Labeled the “economic case,” the
prosecutors viewed these leaders as sharing culpability for the war. 154
Industrialists and financers gave Hitler the necessary means to rearm
Germany with full knowledge of his goal to expand German borders. 155
Although the “economic case” resulted in acquittals for all but one
defendant, 156 the precedent is an important one. By allowing trials to
proceed, the Nuremburg tribunal explicitly recognized the prima facie case
of individual accountability for aggression outside of the traditional State
structure.
¶53

As the emerging cyber battlefield gains importance, the individuals
with roles most similar to the Nuremburg economic defendants will not be
the manufacturers of the computers, but the bug hunters and the leaders of
the RBN. However, under the SWGCA’s definition, these individuals are
only included when their acts interface with State-sponsored cyber
aggression. Their actions would be viewed as impertinent to the
international system should they sell cyber assets or develop malicious
programming solely for non-State actors.
¶54

¶55
The likely choice by the SWGCA to include JCE as the standard for
liability in the crime of aggression eliminates many of the issues associated
with the disaggregation of warfare. By removing the common-law
conspiracy requirement for agreement to achieve a collective purpose, the
significant contributors to cyber weaponry can be held liable for their acts.
The leaders of organizations who commit criminal acts that have a
foreseeable consequence of aiding cyber aggression would be considered
part of the JCE.

New Conceptions of Territoriality
The SWGCA definition makes frequent reference to territory. 157
Paragraph 1 limits the definition of aggression to acts directed at the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State. 158 The examples described in paragraph 2 rely heavily on territory,
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using the term seven times. 159 For example, the paragraph refers to the
invasion or attack of territory, the annexation of territory, and the
bombardment of territory. Blockades are limited to ports and coasts. 160
The frequent references to territory continue the traditionalistic
trend of the SWGCA definition. Cyber attacks will rarely conform to
historic conceptions of territory. Attacks can be triggered from any location
with Internet access. Botnets can easily be transcontinental. The
consequences of suspected Chinese disruption of North American power
grids affected both Americans and Canadians. 161 The origins, staging,
targets, and consequences for these attacks will not be contained neatly
within the borders drawn on a map.
¶57

¶58
The leadership clause, conduct verbs, and use of JCE contain no
explicit limitations to traditional notions of territoriality. Judges should
refrain from transposing the territorial references of the second paragraph’s
definition of aggressive acts to the first paragraph’s definition of the crime
of aggression. The abilities of leaders to orchestrate aggressive acts outside
the limitations of traditional territoriality extend beyond cyber warfare. An
exiled leader who orchestrates an aggressive act with conventional
weaponry should face the same consequences as a sitting leader who gives
orders from his capital city.

Both territorial issues and the structure of the Internet create
significant challenges for the application of the Rome Statute’s
jurisdictional trigger to cyber attacks. Generally speaking, the ICC will
invoke jurisdiction when a signatory party is either the aggressor or victim
of an act that meets the definition. 162 Article 12 of the Rome Statute creates
jurisdiction when the conduct occurs in or is committed by a national of a
signatory State. 163 It also includes the vessels and aircraft of the signatory
States. 164 The SWGCA has generally agreed that Article 12 includes both
¶59
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the territory of the conduct and the consequence, ensuring liability for
missile attacks and other remote strike capabilities. 165
¶60
While these clarifying remarks provide sufficient jurisdictional
guidance for traditional weaponry, the question is greatly complicated by
the internet’s structure. The natural flow of information on the internet
creates unpredictable routing through various jurisdictions. A cyber attack
will nearly certainly be routed through a large number of territories. The
Court must determine whether such routing creates sufficient “conduct” to
create jurisdiction of the court. Further, the relocation of Georgian websites
to the United States creates another example of jurisdictional difficulty. The
cyber attacks that occurred after the move attacked not Georgia’s, but an
American company’s equipment. The crime of aggression in cyberspace
creates the question of whether the territory should be virtual, actual, or
both.

III. PRESCRIPTIONS, PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE
ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES AT THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE
A new form of warfare
¶61
To sufficiently counter the emerging challenges of cyber attacks,
the ASP must adopt a framework that can be interpreted as inclusive of nontraditional attacks by non-traditional actors. This framework will likely
require a normative shift, focusing on the consequences of collective acts
rather than the instrumentalities used in their execution.
¶62
Professor Michael Schmitt, in a 1999 article, examined the use of
force framework established by the UN Charter in light of the then-recent
emergence of computer network attacks. 166 According to Schmitt, the UN
Charter drafters truly wished to regulate consequences of State action. 167
Yet the necessity to articulate workable normative standards required them
to instead pursue restrictions on instrumentalities. 168 Instrumentalities
include the use of military, economic, and diplomatic force. 169 By
regulating instrumentalities, the drafters sought indirectly to regulate the
consequences of their use. 170 However, cyber attacks no longer fit neatly
into these preexisting divisions. Rather, the diversity of potential cyber
attacks spans the range of consequences. As cyber attacks no longer fit
neatly into the preexisting divisions of instrumentalities, Schmitt argues that
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the best approach is to shift the normative framework by deconstructing
those instrumentalities back to their original “community values.” 171 These
values can then be used as shorthand to determine the legality of various
levels of cyber attack. 172
¶63
A normative framework shift is vital to international law’s
adaptation to cyber warfare. Without it, the current prohibitions on force
lack sufficient breadth to adequately address the many forms of cyber
attack. However, Schmitt's proposal suffers from a significant flaw—the
process of applying consequences inherently requires waiting for the actions
to occur. While the proposal may be sufficient to cast judgment on past
action, the process raises serious and important questions regarding the
Rome Statutes principle of legality. Even to the attacker the consequences
of a cyber attack may be unknown at the time the attack is triggered. More
importantly, cyber tactics have shown a disturbing flexibility in swiftly
shifting between legal and illegal international acts. A State faced with
potential cyber aggression cannot wait for the consequences of the
aggressive act when determining the appropriate reaction.
¶64
Analogizing cyber tactics to those of traditionally recognized
aggressive acts would be an alternative to Schmitt’s proposal. For example,
a DDoS attack that disabled electronic commerce could be analogized to a
blockade of a port. However, the analogy approach would violate the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege codified in Article 22 of the Rome
Statute. 173 Article 22 requires the definition of a crime be strictly construed
and not extended by analogy. 174 Further, while the analogy approach would
include cyber attacks that cause physical damage similar to traditional
attacks, analogy would fail to include the more likely attacks that merely
cause costly and significant disruption of economic and communications
systems.

Broad interpretation of the term “armed” is a second alternative. 175
By including non-traditional armaments in the term, the definition broadens
significantly without any further revision. 176 The de minimus clause serves
as a protection against over inclusion. 177 Article 22 of the Rome Statute
would not prevent this expansion, as the broad interpretation of “armed” is
not accomplished through analogy. 178 Both of these alternatives fail to
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address the greatest flaw in Schmitt’s proposal—the flexibility of cyber
tactics. States faced with a decision of how to respond to a cyber attack that
could quickly morph into a clearly aggressive act lack guidance on the
appropriate response. Further guidance on this issue will likely need to
come from another international body.
¶66
Key to any such solution is the interpretation of the SWGCA
definition as containing an ‘open’ exemplary list of aggressive acts. A
normative shift provides a base for constraining the use of cyber attacks in
modern warfare, but the shift alone is insufficient to deal with the increased
individuality of cyberspace. Presumably, Schmitt would continue to use the
traditional concept of State actor in determining the applicability of
international restrictions.

Substantial Involvement of Non-State Actors
¶67
The ongoing SWGCA attempt to define the crime of aggression
provides an excellent opportunity to not only shift the normative framework
for the conceptualizing use of force, but also provide for individual
accountability on a global scale. The ASP should embrace the concept of
individual responsibility for the actions of non-State actors and reject the
artificial limitation to State actions. Combining this alteration with an
articulation of a consequence-based normative framework will greatly
enable the international community to adapt the crime of aggression to
some of the greatest challenges threatening world peace and stability.
¶68
Davis Brown considered—and ultimately rejected—the use of the
ICC to combat the growing threat of cyber warfare. 179 In dismissing the
ICC, Brown cited the inflexibility of Article 22 of the Rome Statute. 180
Since Article 8 of the Rome Statute contains an extensive list of specific
acts considered ‘war crimes,’ those occurring in cyberspace would not be
included in the court’s jurisdiction. Instead of the ICC, Brown argued any
new convention should refer disputes to the ICJ 181 More states are likely to
sign such a convention as it bypasses resistance to the ICC from key
players, such as China and the United States. 182
¶69
Brown’s criticism of the ICC fails to consider two important
issues. 183 The first is the ability of the ICC to mold the crime of aggression
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to include this very real and very likely future battlefield. 184 Brown’s
criticism of the inflexibility of the Rome Statute and its principle of nullum
crimen sine lege may prove accurate for war crimes. However, by drafting a
definition that includes aggressive acts in cyberspace, the ASP can bypass
Brown’s critique of the current Statute. The definition of the crime of
aggression represents an important opportunity to provide the statute much
needed relevance throughout the twenty-first century.
¶70
Secondly, Brown’s suggestion of referring disputes to the ICJ
eliminates the ability of the international community to hold individuals
accountable for their aggressive acts. Brown admits that the ICJ lacks the
power to directly regulate individual behavior, but prefers the ICJ as a
means of bringing as many countries into his proposed convention as
possible. 185 While such an effort at compromise is admirable, it ignores the
greatest issue with regulating cyber warfare: the ease with which non-State
collectives can engage in devastating asymmetric warfare with low costs
and high levels of anonymity. 186
¶71
Brown’s overall recommendation of developing a Law of Armed
Conflict for cyberspace remains a popular one. 187 While the applicability of
certain aspects of jus in bello provide unique challenges and likely will
require significant amendment or addition, such efforts fail to deal with the
larger problem of jus ad bellum that provide a greater risk to the
international community. The ASP’s task of drafting a definition of
aggression provides the necessary opportunity to both update the jus ad
bellum for the new battlefield while simultaneously creating individual
responsibility for those acts.
¶72
The ASP should consider expanding the crime of aggression to
include actions by non-State actors, as they have done with other
international crimes. The realities of cyberspace greatly increase the ability
of non-State groups to regularly and devastatingly function as aggressive
actors in the international system. The ASP should provide the ICC with the
capability of prosecuting all individuals responsible for the aggressive acts
of collectives.

The Disaggregation of Warfare
¶73
The disaggregation of warfare in cyberspace alone provides limited
challenges for the SWGCA definition. The SWGCA decision to include
expansive conduct verbs and both effective and direct forms of leadership,
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combined with the presumed use of a JCE standard allow the definition to
apply equally to all leaders of an aggressive cyber act. The difficulties from
the disaggregation of warfare derive from the interplay of disaggregation
with the other characteristics of cyber attacks. Disaggregation is the factor
that underscores the importance of moving past a State-centric definition
that includes simplistic concepts of territoriality, and reliance on outdated
examples of aggressive action. Disaggregation is the factor that requires a
reexamination of these other aspects of the definition. Disaggregation
requires the leadership clause and conduct verbs be interpreted broadly, in a
manner consistent to effectuate other adjustments in the definition of the
crime of aggression.

New Conceptions of Territoriality
¶74
Cyberspace and its new territoriality create largely conceptual
rather than practical requirements for the definition of aggression. The
definition should shift significantly from that of the 1974 GA Resolution
and reject the archaic rigidity of territoriality. The prosecutors and judges of
the ICC will be faced with difficult jurisdictional questions stemming from
the evolving conceptions of territory and cyberspace. The breadth of ICC
jurisdiction can be greatly increased if the physical routing of attacks is
considered when determining whether a State party to the Rome Statute was
attacked. Including both the State victim in cyberspace and the State whose
physical assets are attacked creates broader jurisdictional opportunities.
Regardless of the interpretative decisions, they must be logically
compatible. An interpretation that disregards the physical routing of cyber
attacks must also disregard the physical location of the servers hosting the
victim State’s cyber assets.

V. CONCLUSION
The threats posed by cyber attacks continue to expand with new
technological developments. Cyber attacks display a new form of conflict,
allow for aggression by non-State collective actors, demonstrate significant
disaggregation of warfare, and challenge the traditional concepts of
territory. In light of these sociological changes to warfare, the ASP should
adjust the emerging definition of aggression to ensure its relevance to future
conflicts. Global reliance on computer networks and the internet will only
increase. As more States integrate their infrastructure, the ferocity of cyber
warfare will escalate. The ICC should be equipped to dampen, if not punish,
these attacks.

¶75

This iBrief has the narrow purpose of demonstrating the necessity
of making a definition of the crime of aggression sociologically relevant for
the likely conflicts of the future. The ICC will be only a part of a solution to
this new threat to international security. An intersecting web of
¶76
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organizations and collaborative efforts will be necessary to fully address the
issue. However, this iBrief’s analysis of the SWGCA’s proposed definition
demonstrates an important lesson. The designers of international legal
frameworks must consider emerging sociological forces when drafting their
language. The sociological forces will significantly shape the environment
in which the new institutions operate. Further, the implementers of those
frameworks—the officers of the new institutions—must be given the
flexibility to adapt them to the challenges of tomorrow.

